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Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise of 
Iraq's Informal Economy 
Robert Looney 
Iraq's economy has undergone a number of profound changes over the last several 
decades, many of which have had significant implications for the manner in which 
the country's informal economy has evolved. The statist, heavy-handed economic 
policies of the Ba'athist government concentrated much of Iraq's productive capacity 
in nationalized factors, which degraded under the sanctions regime of the 1990s, 
when both industrial and agricultural production faltered for lack of inputs. 
When coalition officials arrived in Iraq after the war, they planned on 
turning Iraq into a free market economy - a model for capitalism in the Middle East 
(Looney 2003). Al; part of this plan, they expected private companies, both foreign 
and domestic, to play a leading role in jump-starting the economy. Free market 
incentives driven by pent-up demand and a massive aid-financed reconstruction 
program were thought to be sufficient to induce a massive wave of .investment and 
hiring of Iraqi workers (Cha 2004). But violence, crime and uncertainty over the 
future have undermined investor confidence, preventing market-driven mechanisms 
from playing their anticipated role. Al; a result, nominal Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) contracted by about 35 percent in 2003. It has recovered little since then, 
despite the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts. 
The only part of the economy to have survived both Saddam Hussein and 
the post-2003 period of instability and insurgency is the country's informal economy. 
In fact, there is ample evidence that the country's informal economy has expanded 
considerably since Saddam's overthrow. In this regard, Iraq's informal economy is 
following a pattern seen in other parts of the world - the informal economy tends to 
grow during periods of economic crisis. This phenomenon has occurred on each of 
the main continents: 
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992 Robert Looney 
• In the 1980s, the Latin American economic crisis produced a significant 
increase in the size of the informal sector and the scope of its activity 
(Tokman 1992); 
• In the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, millions of people who lost 
formal jobs in the former East Asian Tiger countries tried to find jobs or 
create work in the informal economy (Lee 1998); 
• Structural adjustment in Africa caused the disruption of many long-standing 
employment patterns and the resulting expansion of informal activities. 
Once developed, the continent's informal sector has continued to grow 
unabated and increasingly encompasses massive money laundering and 
counterfeiting operations, illegal trade in minerals, and the trafficking of 
humans and narcotics (Fashoyin 1993); and 
• Economic transition in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern 
Europe was associated with an expansion of employment in the informal 
economy, much of which persists today (Oxford Analytica 2004). 
Perhaps because of the inherent difficulties in measuring informal economic 
activities, compounded by the reluctance of many government agencies to 
acknowledge its importance, the informal economy has been neglected in policy 
discussions. 1 A similar development is occurring in Iraq, where despite the obvious 
importance of the informal economy, it is barely mentioned in the many official 
economic reports. In fact, few systematic attempts have been made to integrate the 
analysis and quantification of the informal economy into an overall review of 
economic developments in Iraq. This lack impairs understanding of the fundamental 
workings of the economy. At the macro level, limited knowledge of the size of the 
informal economy impedes monetary policy's ability to control inflation. At the 
sectoral level, neglecting the informal economy blurs the ability to understand what is 
happening with commerce, services, and the regional flow of goods and services. 
While at the micro level, lack of information on the informal economy hinders an 
effective assessment of which households can or cannot cope on their own during the 
transition. 
The omission of a systematic treatment of the informal economy impairs the 
provision of effective advice on the proper course for reconstruction and the policies 
most effective in inducing maximum gains in productive employment and output. As 
an initial attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge of the Iraqi economy, the sections 
that follow develop a framework for understanding the possible extent, causes and 
policy implications oflraq's informal economy. 
Iraq's Informal Economy Prior to the Overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
Historically Iraq was one of the major agricultural countries in the world. However, 
since the 1950s, the country's economy has been increasingly dominated by the oil 
sector. While not employing many workers the oil sector in a normal year provides 
the country with about 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. 
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Table 1. Labor Market Data From the 1997 Census 
Civilian labor force as a percentage of population aged 1 O+ 
Shares of civilian labor force employed in: 
Public Administration 




Mining and quarrying (including oil drilling) 
Other 
Total 
Share of civilian labor force unemployed 
Total 

























Data from Iraq's 1997 census can be used to generate labor-force 
participation rates and employment shares by industry (Table 1). The results, which 
are limited to civilian employees outside the Kurdish region, suggest that about two-
thirds of Iraqi males aged 10 and older were in the labor force, though oAly 7.5 
percent of females in the same age group were. This rate of female participation is 
low even among economies of the Middle East. 
As is the case with many of the Middle East oil producing states, 
employment patterns in Iraq have been affected by what is often termed the Rentier 
State Syndrome (Looney 2004). Because the oil sector itself is not capable of 
absorbing many workers, a disproportionate number of workers must be absorbed 
through oil financed public sector employment. The largest employers for men were 
public administration, wholesale and retail trade and agriculture. For women, major 
employers were education, agriculture and public administration. At the time of the 
census, about eighteen percent of men and two percent of women were unemployed 
(Foote et al. 2004 ). 
Because the sanctions regime of the 1990s placed severe constrains on 
government revenues, the private sector had been expanding relative to the public 
sector throughout this period to the extent that before the April 2003 war, a minority 
of the country's workers were employed by the government. Most people worked in 
the private sector, though a majority of these jobs were in the informal sector. Many 
were engaged in trading or subsistence agriculture or some other form of self· 
employment. 
While Iraq's oil has always held out the prospect for future prosperity, the 
unfortunate fact is that most oil-rich developing countries are underperformers across 
a whole spectrum of economic, social, political and governance standards (Gelb 
1988). Large windfall gains associated with a rapid increase in oil prices have been a 
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particular problem in that they "appear to create severe distortions in the working of 
the economy and the political system with strongly negative socio-political 
consequences" (Stevens 2002). In countries as diverse as Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, 
and Indonesia, the combination of state infancy and revenue windfalls has proved 
overwhelming, undermining even the best efforts to develop each country's non-oil 
economy, eradicate poverty and improve living standards for broad-based segments of 
the population (Isham et al. 2002). 
Almost universally, agriculture has been adversely affected by the growth and 
expansion of the oil sector. In the case of an initial agricultural-based economy such as 
Iraq's, a commonly observed pattern is one whereby the exchange rate appreciation 
resulting from a ramp up of oil exports is likely to reduce the profitability and 
competitiveness of traditional agricultural exports. It would also encourage imports of 
food and raw materials, which may compete with domestic production; it is also likely 
to discourage the emergence of new manufacturing exports, essential for the 
successful diversification of the economy and job creation in the formal economy 
(Looney 2004a, 17). 
Within this environment, economic policy and government actions have 
also contributed to the expansion of the informal economy. Economists have 
traditionally considered the size of the informal economy to be not only a function of 
the level of development but, perhaps critically, a function of government policy, 
particularly with respect to regulation, taxation and the size of the pubic sector. As has 
been extensively documented in the literature, 2 high taxes and a large but restricted 
(often by unionization or party membership) bureaucracy have tended to be associated 
with substantial informal sectors, with the latter acting, in part, as an employment 
ladder to the public sector (Aarris and Todaro 1970). 
In addition, explanations of the relative size of the informal economy in the 
developing countries have increasingly stressed the importance of relative 
competences of governments and associated institutions. Where governments have 
provided an uncertain policy environment, where rules and restraints have been 
ineffectual, and where public agencies have possessed an overall low level of 
credibility, the informal sector tends to account for a larger share of GDP as 
entrepreneurs attempt to evade capricious actions by public agencies. Openness to 
world market forces tends to minimize the economic distortions that governments 
can create, thus often reducing the incentives for entrepreneurs to engage in informal 
activity (World Bank 1997). 
Several of these general considerations concerning the extent of the informal 
economy are borne out empirically. Preliminary analysis (Looney 2006) suggests a 
clear pattern exists whereby the relative size of a country's informal economy (as a 
share of Gross National Product (GNP)) is related to its progress in opening up to the 
world economy. Those countries that are relatively closed and inward oriented (like 
Iraq around the year 2000) tend to have large informal economies, while those 
countries open to the pressures of globalization have much smaller informal 
economies. Furthermore, the informal sector becomes significantly smaller as 
countries increase their control over corruption. 
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Al> might have been expected, Iraq under Saddam fell in a group of countries 
with the highest probability of possessing a large informal economy. The profile of 
these countries is an inward-oriented trade regime with high levels of corruption. 
Other countries in this group included oil-based rentier economies such as Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Indonesia, and Azerbaijan. A typical share of informal activity in this set of 
countries was around 35 percent of GDP in 2000 (Looney 2006). 
Finally, Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste (2002) have calculated the 
likely shadow labor force in a group of developing countries for 1998. They present 
values of the shadow economy labor force in absolute terms, and as a percentage of 
the official labor force under the assumption that the shadow economy in rural areas 
is at least as high as in the cities (where the original surveys were taken). While Iraq 
does not appear in their sample, there is a close relationship between the size of the 
shadow economy and its associated labor force. Using the 35 percent of GDP figure 
for Iraq's shadow economy derived above produces an estimate that Iraq's shadow 
labor force equaled 68.3 percent of the total labor force in 1998. This is equivalent to 
a shadow labor force of 32.2 percent of the total population. 
Factors Contributing to the Size of the Informal Economy 
In addition to the general factors noted above, Iraq's informal economy has been 
affected by that country's on-going crises. Clearly, conflict - wars, sanctions, and 
insurgency (Looney 2005) - can take a heavy toll on formal activities. When private 
firms or public enterprises are downsized or closed due to conflict, retrenched workers 
often find the informal sector the only source of livelihood. Also in response to 
conflict driven inflation or cutbacks in public services, households often need to 
supplement formal sector incomes with informal earnings. In severe crises, the 
breakdown of law and order often leads to an expansion of criminal activity, some of 
which is carried out in the shadow economy - street vendors selling stolen 
merchandise, etc. 
Given the complete lack of data normally used3 (currency holdings, 
electricity usage, tax returns, national income accounts) to infer the size of a country's 
informal economy, informal activities in post-Saddam Iraq must be deduced from an 
indirect set of indicators. The key is to identify those forces most likely to provide 
incentives to operate in the informal economy and those which might make informal 
activities less advantageous. 
Individuals in Iraq are likely, within a given security environment, to 
respond to a series of demographic and economic pressures as well as various 
institutional constraints. In this regard, since the overthrow of Saddam, several sets of 
competing forces have been at work to expand the size of the country's informal 
economy. The uncertainty created by the insurgency together with on-going 
corruption is likely to have increased the size of Iraq's informal economy. This 
situation is compounded by the country's population bulge, which is accelerating the 
number of new workers coming into the labor force. 
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Demographics 
While rapid population growth is no doubt a significant factor in the rise of Iraq's 
informal economy, its precise role, is hard to assess. For one thing, our picture of 
Iraq's demographic structure and change over time is far from perfect (EIU 2004). 
Specifically, there are serious doubts about the population figures produced in Iraq's 
last official census conducted in 1997. That census suggested a population of 21. 7 
million. Building on that census, the United Nations (2005) estimates Iraq's 
population at around 25 million in 2000 (Table 2). 
This figure is roughly consistent with figures obtained from the now 
dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). These estimates suggest that 
excluding those resident in the three self-ruled Kurdish provinces, the country's 
population in 2001 was 21.5 million. Rough estimates for these three provinces 
would indicate that some 4 million people resided there in 2001. 
Second, the precise rate of population growth is also unknown. The United 
Nations estimates the growth gradually decelerating from 3.1 percent per annum 
during the period 1990-95 to around 2.8 percent in 2000-05. The International 
Monetary Fund (2004) estimates the current figure at 2.7 percent per annum, while 
lower than the early 1990s is still relatively high, even for developing countries. 
Relatively high rates of population growth are likely to continue over the next decade 
because of the large number of females in the high birth rate age groups. 
Third, albeit to a lesser extent, the precise extent of urbanization is also 
unclear. For a developing country, Iraq appears very urbanized. The growth of cities 
has been rapid ever since the adoption of state planning policies in the · 1960s 
designed to develop industry and to manage the agricultural sector. In fact, the 
country is likely to have experienced an accelerating trend of migration to urban 
centers from less prosperous rural areas. Rough estimates suggest that Baghdad and 
its surrounding province accounted for more than 31 percent of the population at the 
time of the 1997 census. A rough figure of the country's urbanization is 65 percent of 
the population now reside in towns. Data form the World Bank (2004) suggests the 
country's urban population grew by approximately 5 percent a year between 1970 and 
2000. 
The youth bulge in Iraq has numerous implications for the informal 
economy as well as the economy in general. Specifically, Iraq's case is more severe 
than most Middle Eastern countries with similar demographic profiles, due to the 
sanctions period of the 1990s severely dampening the country's job creation potential. 
There is little doubt that young first-time Iraqi job seekers bore the brunt of high 
unemployment and stagnant real wages in the 1990s. This continues to be the case 
today. 
The other side of the demographic pressure on labor markets is the pattern 
of employment in the formal sector. With significant pay increases (Schumway 2004) 
for public workers and little private sector employment, a dualistic labor market is 
being created. Higher wages and non-wage benefits, together with job security in the 
public sector, has resulted in a disproportionate number of Iraqis seeking work in this 
sector as opposed to the private sector. 
R
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Table 2. Iraq: Demographic Profile Medium Variant, 1970.2020 
r 
Year I 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 ~ j:)· 
Indicator I ~ 
Population (thousands) I 10,112 11,972 14,093 16,288 18,515 21,632 25,075 28,807 32,534 36,473 40,522 I 
c:: 
Male Population (thousands) I 5,100 6,051 7,132 8,246 9,378 10,956 12,700 14,587 16,471 18,461 20,496 a a 
..;; 
Female Population (thousands) I 5,012 5,921 6,961 8,042 9,137 10,676 12,375 14,221 16,063 18,012 20,026 ~ 
~ 
Population sex ratio (males per l 00 I ::i S:i females) 101.8 102.2 102.5 102.5 102.6 102.6 102.6 102.6 102.5 102.5 102.3 !"). ~ 
Percentage aged Q..4 (%) I 18.8 19 18.2 17.2 17.3 16.6 16 15 13.8 12.9 12 ·:;i fl) 
Percentage aged S.14 (%) I 28.6 28.9 28.9 28.6 27.3 26.9 26.6 26 25.2 23.8 22.5 ~ fl) 
Percentage aged l S.24 (%) I 20.6 20.2 20.4 20.3 20 
~ 
18.7 18.4 19.5 20.5 20.7 20 ~ 
Percentage aged 60 or over (%) 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.6 ~ ~ ... 
S" 
Percentage aged 65 or over (%) I 3.1 3 3 3.1 3.1 3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3 3.4 ~ 
Percentage aged 80 or over (%) I 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 l 
Percentage of women aged 15-49 (%) I 42.5 41.9 42.9 44.5 45.8 46.9 48.1 49.5 50.9 51.9 52.7 ~ ::i 
Median age (years) 16.1 16 16.3 16.9 17.4 17.9 18.4 19.1 20.l 21.3 22.6 ~ ~ 
Population density (per sq. km) 23 27 32 37 42 49 57 66 74 83 92 l.O 
l.O 
Source: United Nations (2005), http://esa.un.org/unpp/ -.J 
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At the same time, the attractiveness of public sector employment, especially 
for those with a secondary education, raises the wage many expect to earn in the 
private sector. The subsequent inability to attract qualified workers needed to direct 
and supervise those with limited education and skills further stifles private sector 
expansion. This process, also dominant in Iraq starting with the Ba'athist rise to 
power in the 1960s, and continuing up to around 1988 (Looney 2004b) was 
previously able to avoid high levels of unemployment and the growing informal 
economy through the rapid expansion of the public sector. Starting with greatly 
constrained finances in the sanctions period, slow public sector employment growth 
has simply left the unemployed or forced them to drift into the informal sector. The 
result is a two-tier system that overprotects formal-sector public employees and under· 
protects workers in the informal sector. 
Institutional Constraints and Transition Dynamics 
In sum, even without the wars and sanctions, it is highly likely that Iraq would have a 
sizable informal economy at this point in time. Those events, together with the 
instability and insurgency following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein have only 
reinforced long standing trends in the country's labor markets. In the post-Saddam 
era several other factors are also affecting the size of the country's informal economy: 
• Compared with the previous regime, there is great political liberalization 
today in Iraq. In transition economies, this normally results in a larger 
informal economy. 
• The demand for services and trade is particularly high due to the 
introduction of free trade soon after the fall of the Hussein regime. Again, 
this factor would encourage the development of an informal economy-petty 
retailing, street vending of imported goods, etc. 
• Currently, bureaucratic discretion and associated corruption are greatly 
contributing to the informal economy. 
• In Iraq's present insurgency, institutional enforcements have weakened, thus 
allowing the incentives for informal activity to become very high. 
• The extent of underdevelopment in the rule of law and related institutional 
enforcement mechanisms have not improved to date. Given the insurgency, 
the enforcement mechanisms may have even declined. 
• In Iraq's case, the present extremely low tax structures should not have been 
a contributing factor to the informal economy, but many marginal firms do 
not like to pay any taxes. 
• The macro economy has been relatively stable, but rising inflation in some 
areas may be contributing to an expansion of the informal economy. 
Of the items noted above, the most critical factor affecting the size of the 
informal economy is, no doubt, the inability of the Iraqi government to control 
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corruption. In addition, given the insurgency and uncertainty surrounding political 
developments, it is safe to say that large segments of the population have reverted to 
the survival relationships characteristic of the period of sanctions in the 1990s. This is 
confirmed daily with the news coming out of Iraq describing economic 
mismanagement (Al..Saadi 2004), vast black markets in gasoline (Noozz.com January 
23, 2005), increased crime, and shortages of critical inputs (Murphy 2005). These 
developments do not bode well and suggest that the current size of the informal 
economy is considerably larger than in the late 1990s. As noted above, another 
ominous sign (Davidson 2004) is a recently released index of corruption for 2004. 
The prestigious Transparency International Corporation ranks Iraq as the most 
corrupt country in the Middle East. The country's current ranking is 129th out of 145 
nations worldwide. 
Based on these factors, it is likely that the size of the underground economy 
has expanded significantly beyond the 35 precent of GDP figure, noted above, for the 
end of the Hussein regime. A safe estimate, in light of the insurgency and its 
detrimental impact on investment, electricity, and transport, would put the informal 
economy at around 65 percent of GDP. 
In addition to the factors noted above, the informal economy may be 
growing simply because of the constraints limiting expansion of formal economic 
activity. Just as private capital formation is often critical to the development of a 
thriving modem economy, social capital creation may be just as essential in creating 
the shift to more formal activities. Again, corruption plays a significant role in 
structuring the informal - this time through its effect on the country's social capital. 
Social Capital 
Social capital refers to networks of relationships that bind people together.5 Social 
capitalists distinguish such relationships from physical capital and, the attributes of 
individuals, or human capital (Scanlon 2003). In the context of Iraqi reconstruction 
and the establishment of a market economy, a key element of social capital centers on 
a component of social capital, the notion of trust. 
Clearly, trust in government institutions will be a necessary prerequisite 
before Iraq can expect any type of significant expansion of the formal economy. Here 
is where the country's problems lie. One of the main impediments to a formal market 
in Iraq today is the absence of trust at most levels. The Ba'athist government created 
a profound imprint on the nature of formal and informal institutions in Iraq. Not 
only did, Ba'athism hamper the emergence of a market economy, it corrupted the 
judicial and legal institutions needed to create and nurture trust. 
In short Iraqi values today are no longer those that were reported in earlier 
accounts of the pre-Ba'athist period, which stressed the country's vibrant 
entrepreneurial spirit. Individual and managers' values have been affected by years of 
repression under authoritarian. top-down decision making. In an environment of 
several decades of political and economic insecurity, doubt and distrust are deeply 
entrenched in the individual mind. They represent a major constraint against 
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drawing entrepreneurs and individuals out of the safe, kinship-based informal 
economy. 
Skill Constraints 
Contrary to popular belief, Iraq does not have an abundance of educated, skilled 
workers. In particular, the country's workforce currently lacks many of the skills 
needed for dynamic private sector growth in the formal market. 
Many deficiencies can be traced back to the socialist development plans 
adopted in the 1960s. On the demand side, Iraq adopted a full employment policy in 
1968, committing the public sector to provide jobs for each and every individual 
regardless of market forces. The result was over employment in the public sector. At 
the same time, the private sector was denied a normal flow of technically skilled 
secondary graduates and young university graduates. This policy created sharp 
manpower imbalances leading to inflationary pressures and lower overall national 
productivity (Looney 2004a). Yet the program was sustainable with oil revenues 
camouflaging the economy's underlying structural weaknesses. 
In addition, and especially prior to 1970, economic development plans in 
Iraq were founded on the idea of investing in physical plant and infrastructure and 
did not give development of human capital a high priority. Labor force needs were 
not spelled out, nor were they based on any realistic estimates of the skill 
requirements implicit in the planned capital investments. The result was a shortage 
of skilled workers in certain technical fields and an excess in others (Mehdi and 
Robinson 1983). 
The situation only deteriorated further during the period of sanctions in the 
1990s. In addition to further cutbacks in the funding of public education, gender 
gaps began to grow due to families' economic needs; when given a choice to send a 
male or female child to school, most chose to keep the girl home. UNESCO 
estimates that, in 1987, about 75 percent of Iraqi women were literate, but by the end 
of 2000 that number had shrunk to 54 percent. According to the same estimates, by 
2000, Iraq had the lowest adult literacy levels in all of the Middle Ease (World Bank 
2004). 
In short, Iraq fell considerably behind neighboring Arab countries in its 
commitment to human capital formation. A recent survey (Peck 2004) suggests some 
areas of training and skill formation to which the government will have to give top 
priority. Survey results are based on 454 interviews of Iraqi business owners or 
managers with less than one hundred employees. The interviews, conducted from 
October 17- December 3, 2004 - 264 of which were in Baghdad, 90 in lbril, and 100 
in Hilla - found that (Peck 2004, 4): 
1. The top n~eds in Iraq's workforce are for more English language and computer 
training; 
2. English training is the top concern for two in five business owners (38%) in 
both Hilla and Irbil; in both cities, computer training ranks second with three 
in ten (30% in Hilla and 32% in lrbil) citing it as the top need; 
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3. In Baghdad, however, the need for English training ranks fourth (17%) behind 
the development of a better work ethic (25%), computer training (22%) and 
improving the educational system (19%); and 
4. Among Shiites, computer training places first (31 %); among Sunnis, English 
training is the top concern (33%). Kurds are slightly more likely than other 
ethnic groups to call for greater English language training (34%) while Arabs 
split between more English training and more computer training (24% and 
25% respectively). 
At the same time that expansion of private sector activity is constrained by 
shortages of appropriately trained workers, the educational system has declined 
through years of neglect and destruction and will take years to renovate and restore. 
According to UNICEF, of 15,000 academic buildings in Iraq, 80 percent are damaged 
and in need of repair, 40 percent require major reconstruction work, and 9 percent 
require complete demolition and rebuilding (IRINnews.org 2004). The Iraqi Ministry 
of Education has set a deadline of four years for rebuilding the system. According to 
USAID, which has provided the bulk of the funding for the effort, approximately 
2,400 schools have already been renovated. 
But reconstruction is not enough: Iraq's growing population means more 
young minds to school than ever before. In 2000, there were 3.6 million Iraqis of 
primary school age. Today, there are 4.3 million. The government is struggling to 
keep up. Overcrowded classes are the norm, and many schools have been forced to 
run two or three shifts a day, at the toll of less classroom time for the students. 
UNICEF estimates that a further 4,500 new schools are needed if class sizes are to be 
brought down to an acceptable level. 
The fact remains, however, that spiraling costs for security, construction 
materials, and labor are restricting the amount the government can reaiistically 
achieve in the reconstruction of the education system in the short term. For the time 
being, the main objective will be to ensure that Iraq's present instability interferes as 
little as possible with the education of the country's children. 
In the meantime, the formal sector will continue to be constrained by a 
shortage of well-trained workers possessing the skills needed for modern production 
and distribution. 
Dynamics of the Informal Economy 
Adding network and labor market conditions to the equation provides additional 
insights to the factors shaping the overall size, and to some extent, the composition of 
Iraq's contemporary informal economy. These are summarized in Figure l, with the 
informal economy seen largely as a function of fundamental supply and demand 
factors: (a) a youth population bulge; (b) a long-standing state employment program 
providing incentives for employment in the public, but not private sector; (c) a 
workforce of diminished skills following a long period of sanctions; (d) little private 
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sector growth stemming from the instability following the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein; (e) deficient social capital, especially in the form of trust, thus confining 
most private sector transactions to the informal market; and (0 openness to trade 
(neo-liberal reforms) makes many potentially profitable firms unprofitable. In turn, 
the lack of a sizable private sector reduces the links often found between the informal 
and formal economy. 
Because the informal economy is largely the result of a convergence of 
powerful long-run demographic and economic forces, it will be a fixture for some time 
to come. At best, informal activities may evolve over the next several years with some 
progression from ascribed based networks to process based networks. If this transition 
is viewed as successful by Iraqi entrepreneurs and the government makes significant 
strides in the governance area, then the progression to process based networks and 
extended modern networks is a distinct possibility, particularly if the security situation 
stabilizes enough to support foreign direct investment. 
Policies Toward the Informal Economy 
Given the high costs and futility of attempting a high investment, large-firm-based 
development strategy, the Iraqi authorities will have to rely on a more balanced 
approach to policy. A key element will involve designing a package of reforms capable 
of providing the right incentives and assurances to induce entrepreneurs in the 
informal economy to begin investing, growing, and shifting their operations to the 
formal sector. While this sounds simple and straightforward, there are numerous 
problems associated with designing public policy in developing countries. 
A cursory reading of the professional literature reveals that, in proscribing 
policies towards the informal economy, analysts often neglect to take into account the 
impacts or tradeoffs in other parts of the economy - what may be good for speeding 
up the transition of the informal economy into formal activities may not be good for 
the general economy or its citizens as a whole. The reverse is also the case. Reforms or 
polices may appear to make perfect sense for broad-based groups, but not for 
vulnerable firms and enterprises. 
One area of policy that can probably be ruled out from the start is the 
reliance on market forces under the existing institutional framework in Iraq. As noted 
earlier, given the sharp cleavage between the formal and informal sectors of the 
economy, small changes in the costs and benefits of remaining in the informal 
economy may not produce dramatic shifts of people and resources to the formal 
sector. It is especially important in this regard to address several factors responsible for 
the growth of the informal economy in the first place. 
Strengthen the Rule of Law. In the past, deterioration in the rule of law and 
related institutional enforcement mechanisms has shifted the balance of incentives 
toward participation in the informal economy. Conversely, the costs of operating in 
the informal economy are likely to increase with increased institutional strength and 
sophistication of market-based institutions, particularly regarding the country's legal 
framework, its enforcement efficacy, and the degree of incorruptibility of the judiciary 
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and civil service. As these institutions develop, they should provide checks and 
balances on potential abuses of bureaucratic discretionary actions increasing the 
penalty of operating unofficially. In turn, enforcement of contracts arid the certainty 
of objective judicial decisions will contribute to the country's social capital and enable 
many in the informal economy to extend their operations beyond the predominant 
family/kinship network. 
A related area involves property titles. This is an especially serious problem 
in the northern parts of the country, where many displaced Kurds and Arabs are 
attempting to restart their lives. Lack of title is also common in the case of widowed, 
female heads of household in rural areas. They usually do not have a clear title to 
their former husband's land and, as a result, are incapable of borrowing needed funds 
for operating the farm or investing in improvements. Again, lack of critical inputs has 
forced many women in rural areas to regress to the informal economy. 
Maintain Low Taxes. High tax rates, multiple taxation, and constantly 
shifting tax regimes provide a power impetus for escape to the unofficial economy. 
The country's tax burden at the present time is relatively low at 15 percent. Care 
must be taken, however, that the government does not revamp the tax system in a way 
that makes participation in the formal economy significantly less attractive. This is 
particularly important to note because the Iraqi government is currently thinking of 
revamping the tax system to offset decreasing tax revenues (Noozz.com November 11, 
2004). 
Strive for Greater Macroeconomic Stability. As noted above, the higher the 
degree of macroeconomic instability, the greater the incentive to engage in unofficial 
transactions. In particular, macroeconomic instability induces flight to foreign 
currency, capital flight, and barter transactions. Further, the doctoring of a firm's 
accounts becomes easier when prices are volatile and changing rapidly. Through most 
of the post-war period, the macro economy has been surprisingly stable with rates of 
inflation considerably lower than forecast. The Iraqi dinar has also been stronger 
than anticipated. 
In January 2005, however, the rate of inflation increased to 13.9 percent 
(Noozz.com February 21, 2005). This increase reflected record increases in 
commodity prices, medical and transport services, in addition to hikes in commercial 
and residential rent. Spending on these items accounts for 90.3 percent of Iraqi 
household spending. 
As part of the country's economic reform program under the Coalitional 
Provisional Authority (CPA), the Central Bank of Iraq was given independence to 
pursue price stability. At this point, the bank must stay with that objective if the 
· informal economy is to be contained. However, there are questions concerning the 
adequacy of the Bank's tools for use in pursuing price stability. Currently, the Bank 
controls the price level through (1) buying and selling foreign currencies and (2) 
facilitating banks credits. However, contradictions in policy arise as anti-inflationary 
efforts put too much pressure on credit markets, thus stifling growth of the formal 
sector. 
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Policies Toward Vulnerable Groups in the Informal Economy 
While some of the policy suggestions noted above may speed the movement of certain 
groups out of the informal economy, much more should be done to assist specific 
groups largely trapped in that sector, in particular, children and women (IMF 2005, 
251). 
Children. On social grounds, efforts should begin immediately to reduce the 
country's serious child labor problems. This can be done through enforcing existing 
labor laws, as well as giving high priority to the restoration and revival of the country's 
school system. As noted above, improving the education system will make child labor 
less attractive. On the other hand, to reduce the need for child labor the government 
needs to provide family subsidies so that children are not critically needed to 
supplement family incomes. 
The Iraqi government is certainly aware of the problem and is working with 
UNICEF to find solutions. At a UNICEF conference in December 2004 (Noozz.com, 
December 4, 2005), participants considered child labor one of the major negative 
aspects of the economy. Participants at the meeting called for the implementation of 
strict procedures to ban child labor and secure primary education to keep them away 
from the labor market. The conference formed a committee that includes 
representatives of the ministries of labor, social welfare, education, security, and 
health to supervise and control children's labor rights and protect them against 
employers who violate the law. The committee will also look into cases of sexual 
abuse and violence exercised against children. 
Women. Large numbers of Iraqi women have entered the informal sector due 
to lost husbands or deteriorating living conditions. The difficulty they face will be 
determined by their educational backgrounds, Ba'athist ties during the previous 
regime, the strength of various religious groups opposed to women working outside 
the household, and their career choices. 
Older women with some education may find that their knowledge 
deteriorated considerably during the period of sanctions. They may have to be 
retrained before resuming work in their chosen area. Younger women may have to 
receive basic education before they can hope to aspire beyond the lower levels of the 
informal economy. 
Women with higher level positions in the Ba'athist party during the 1990s 
may find that they are effectively barred from the public sector. No doubt many of 
these will also lack the skills and training to succ~ed in the informal economy, 
especially in jobs that require strong business skills and a willingness to assume some 
risk. In addition to constraints imposed by religious groups, credit would appear to 
be the main factor limiting women from running small businesses in the informal 
sector. While some micro-credit efforts are yielding encouraging results, the ability 
and willingness of the country and its banking system to develop this area of support 
is doubtful. 
Ultimately, what happens to women in the coping/informal sector will 
largely be controll~d by developments in the formal sector, as well as the growing 
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power of religious groups. The condition of women in the country will be a good 
barometer of the manner in which the country and its economy is likely to evolve over 
the next few years. 
Conclusions 
While Iraq's informal economy remains largely unmeasured, several tentative 
observations can be made concerning its overall scope and underlying determinants 
and their policy implications: 
1. Iraq's informal economy has increased considerably since April 2003. The 
biggest increases have been in the areas of small-scale urban services and 
criminal activity. Smaller increases have occurred in agriculture and various 
small scale industries. 
2. A safe estimate of the current size of the informal economy is around 65 percent 
of GDP, although this may be a bit conservative. Approximately 80 percent of 
the labor force is engaged in informal activity, if one assumes that many workers 
listed as unemployed are really using the informal economy as a coping strategy 
until formal sector jobs appear. 
3. Higher rates of economic growth, or even a lessening of the insurgency with 
stepped-up reconstruction efforts, are not likely to result in a significant decline 
in the size of Iraq's informal economy in the near term. Instead, there are a 
number of more policy-centered measures available to stop and reverse the 
expansion of the informal economy. These include improved governance, 
especially improving the rule of law and anti-corruption measures. Specific tax 
policies, together with macroeconomic stability would also provide incentives 
for individuals to move into more formal activities. 
4. This strategy might be supplemented with an expanded social net designed to 
provide short run security, especially for two of the more vulnerable groups: 
women and children. 
Notes 
1. A no"table exception is the International Labor Organization (!LO) whose many publications have 
stimulated some debate on the issue. 
2. For an extensive survey see Schneider and Enste, (2002), and J. J. Thomas (l 992). 
3. For a survey of the standard methods of estimating the size of the informal economy see Schneider 
and Enste (2002). 
4. An excellent overview of the literature on social capital can be found in Paldam (2000). 
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